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Preparation and Trial of a Medical
Malpractice Case
John J. Kennett*
L AW IMPLIES FROM THE EMPLOYMENT of a doctor a contract
that the doctor will diagnose and treat his patient with that
degree of skill and learning which is possessed by the average
member of his profession in the community in which he practices.
A doctor licensed to practice is presumed to possess such skill and
learning. He does not incur liability for his mistakes if he has
used methods, in his diagnosis and treatment, recognized and
approved by the average member of the medical profession
practicing in his community. A doctor's negligence in departing
from the standard of practice in his community must be estab-
lished by medical testimony, except in those cases where the
negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would have no
difficulty in recognizing it.'
A bad medical result in and of itself is not, in the usual case,
evidence Of negligence.2 A bad result in connection with other
facts may, however, be considered by the jury, under proper
instructions, in arriving at the ultimate fact of negligence.3 And,
in some cases where it is apparent to the ordinary layman that
the result could not have occurred but for negligence, the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, or its equivalent by whatever name it
may be called, applies.4
* Member of the firm of Kennett, McCutcheon & Soderland, of Seattle,
Washington; former Chief Dep. Prosecuting Atty. of King County, Wash.;
Special Pros. Atty., Snohomish County, Wash.; former Washington State
President of NACCA; Advisory Editor of Negligence & Compensation Serv-
ice; etc.
[Editor's Note: This article is the substance of a lecture delivered re-
cently before a national audience of attorneys.]
1 Sawdey v. Spokane Falls, 30 Wash. 349, 70 P. 972 (1902); Williams v.
Wurdemann, 71 Wash. 300, 128 P. 639 (1912); Peterson v. Hunt, 197 Wash.
255, 84 P. 2d 999 (1938); Crouch v. Wychoff, 6 Wash. 2d 273, 107 P. 2d 339
(1940); Helland v. Bridenstine, 55 Wash. 470, 104 P. 626 (1909); Swanson
v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 P. 135 (1918); Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wash. 2d
14, 163 P. 2d 148 (1946).
2 Gruginski v. Lane, 177 Wash. 121, 30 P. 2d 970 (1934); Howatt v. Cart-
wright, 128 Wash. 343, 222 P. 496 (1924).
3 Prather v. Downs, 164 Wash. 427, 2 P. 2d 709 (1931).
4 Helland v. Bridenstine, 55 Wash. 470, 104 P. 626 (1909) (a case involving
a gonorrheal infection following the use of an unsterilized speculum);
Wharton v. Warner, 74 Wash. 470, 135 P. 235 (1913) (a part of an instru-
ment became detached and was left in the body of the patient); Wynne v.
Harvey, 96 Wash. 379, 165 P. 67 (1917) (a silk thread of too large a size
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A specialist is held to a higher degree of care than a general
practitioner. The law requires that he use in diagnosis and
treatment that degree of professional skill usually possessed and
used by specialists engaged in like practice in the same or similar
communities.5
If the doctor was negligent in assembling data necessary
and essential for a diagnosis, and if he failed to make use of avail-
able diagnostic aids, and such failure on his part proximately
caused the result complained of, this spells out an actionable
malpractice case.6
Some other acts of negligence are sometimes overlooked:
The doctor may have violated some health regulation or statute.7
A surgeon operating with the consent of his patient is privileged
only to perform the particular operation for which the consent
has been given. If he performs surgery in addition to that to
which the patient has given his consent or for which he obtains
a consent from the patient's spouse, parent, or other closely re-
lated individual, the surgeon is liable for damages.8 It is only in
those cases where the patient's life is in danger that the surgeon
can escape liability for surgery that goes beyond that for which
consent was given.9
Sometimes the explanation for an unexpected result is that
the doctor mistook one patient for another. In such cases the
element of the patient's consent is, of course, lacking and the
doctor is liable for damages thus caused.10
If the patient is not warned of possible danger of any in-
tended treatment and given the opportunity of refusing it, and
was used by the operating surgeon and it, together with a sponge, was left
in the body); Alonzo v. Rogers, 155 Wash. 206, 283 P. 709 (1930) (a piece
of hypodermic needle was found in the gum after an attempted tooth
extraction); Tennant v. Barton, 164 Wash. 279, 2 P. 2d 735 (1931) (after a
tonsil operation, followed with bad results, a piece of hypodermic needle
was found imbedded in the throat).
5 Atkins v. Clein, 3 Wash. 2d 168, 100 P. 2d 1 (1940).
6 Peterson v. Hunt, 197 Wash. 255, 84 P. 2d 999 (1938); Just v. Littlefield,
87 Wash. 299, 151 P. 780 (1915); Hoover v. McCormick, 247 S. W. 718 (Ky.,
1923); James v. Grigsby, 220 P. 267 (Kans., 1923); Whitson v. Hillis, 215
N. W. 480 (Md., 1927); McBride v. Saylin, 56 P. 2d 941 (Calif., 1936).
7 Atkins v. Clein, n. 5, above.
8 Physician's and Dentist's Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P.
2d 568 (1941).
9 Wells v. Van Nort, 125 N. E. 910 (Ohio, 1919); 34 Am. Jur. 85; 21 R. C. L.
392; 26 A. L. R. 1036.
10 Samuelson v. Taylor, 160 Wash. 369, 295 P. 113 (1931); Gill v. Selling,
267 P. 812 (Ore., 1928); 76 A. L. R. 563; 13 A. L. R. 2d 151.
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as a result thereof is injured through the treatment, the doctor
is liable in damages. 1
Another ground of liability is discontinuance of treatment
before the patient is cured. Implicit in this is also the rule that
a doctor is liable if he fails to visit and treat his patient. 2
A malpractice case can be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence. 13 Not every issue in such a case can be so proved. The
standard of practice existing in the community obviously cannot
be so proved. There must be direct evidence on that point. In
some cases, proximate cause cannot be so proved. In other cases
it can. I suggest the possibility of proving proximate cause by
the use of hospital records, and by the use of medical textbooks
in those states where the same are admissible in evidence. Fre-
quently the "standards of practice" as well as "proximate cause"
can be proven by pretrial depositions. It is often easy, by such
depositions, to develop facts which result in the raising of an
issue which will entitle the case to go to the jury.
If you are successful in getting the defendant doctor to make
vehement denials of the facts claimed, it is ordinarily quite easy,
with a proper question, to get him to say that if such facts had
existed, he would have made a different diagnosis and followed
a different course of treatment, because to do otherwise would
have been bad practice.
The doctor, of course, should be required to produce all of
his records at the time the deposition is taken, and they should
be identified as an exhibit and offered as part of the deposition.
Thus they are impounded with the Notary and are available to
the attorneys for inspection or copy. After this, and after im-
pounding the hospital records, the depositions of other doctors
practicing in the community, skilled in the particular subject
matter, should be obtained. Of course, such depositions must be
delayed until after careful review of the records already im-
pounded with the Notary. In those states which have adopted
rules for pre-trial discovery, such as are found in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, one may take the depositions of ex-
11 Hunter v. Burroughs, 96 S. E. 360 (Va., 1918); Paulsen v. Gunderson,
260 N. W. 448 (Wis., 1935).
12 Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash. 2d 257, 130 P. 2d 341 (1942); Murgatroyd v.
Dudley, 184 Wash. 222, 50 P. 2d 1025 (1935); Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash.
489, 68 P. 2d 1034 (1937); Adams v. Henry, 131 N. W. 62 (Mich., 1911);
Blackburn v. Curd, 106 S. W. 1186 (Ky., 1908); Tanner v. Aiken, 101 N. W.
769 (Ia., 1904); Sinclair v. Brunson, 180 N. W. 358 (Mich., 1920); 41 Am.
Jur. 216, § 100 et seq.; 60 A. L. R. 664; 21 R. C. L. 389.
13 Atkins v. Clein, see n. 5, above.
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perts, even though they have never seen nor examined your
client. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure author-
izes such depositions.
It has been my experience, that if you keep the questions on
a sound, professional, hypothetical, academic basis, that you will,
in all probability, elicit the testimony which you desire.
The defense of contributory negligence in a medical mal-
practice case is not a bar to the action, but may be considered
only in mitigation of damages. 14
Frequently, defense counsel claim that the plaintiffs have
the burden of proving what portion of their alleged damage was
due to the original ailment, and what portion to the alleged negli-
gence, and that, failing so to do, they cannot recover. Such is
not the law.15
According to sections (a), (d) and (d) (2) of the above
mentioned Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure you
are entitled to take not only the deposition of the defendant doc-
tor, but also those of any other doctor. You will note that Rule
26 (d) (2) provides that the "deposition of a party * * * may be
used by an adverse party for any purpose." This rule means
exactly what it says, and under it, "any part or all" of the de-
fendant doctor's deposition may be used as substantive evidence
and may be offered by the plaintiff in his case-in-chief.' 6
Admissions of a party, wherever made and under whatever
circumstances made, are, and have, from time immemorial, been
admissible in evidence. The fact that the admissions were elicited
during the taking of a deposition does not make them one whit
different than if they had been uttered by the defendant at the
corner drug store. The only question is, are the offered admis-
sions relevant or material to the issues in the case.
Rule 26 is a potent weapon with which you may establish
by medical proof, from the defendant doctor himself, the stand-
ards of practice in his community. The standard of practice, with
respect to many diseases and conditions, is the same throughout
the United States. Of course, you will not know what this stand-
14 Sauers v. Smits, 49 Wash. 557, 95 P. 1097 (1908); Gould v. McKenna, 27
Am. Rep. 705 (Penna., 1878); Beadle v. Pain, 80 P. 903 (Ore., 1905); DuBois
v. Decker, 29 N. E. 313 (N. Y., 1891); 14 L. R. A. 429.
15 McCormick v. Jones, 152 Wash. 502, 278 P. 181 (1929) (burden of proof is
on the respondent, doctor, when there is contributory negligence on the
part of the patient).
16 Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, 162 F. 2d 779 (CCA, 2, 1947); Snodgrass v.
Kohen et al., 96 F. Supp. 292, 294 (D. C., 1951).
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ard of practice is unless you have had medical advice in advance,
or have made careful research of available medical treatises.
Early in your examination of the doctor, elicit in great detail
the particular courses of study that he pursued in medical col-
lege; the names of the textbooks which he studied with regard
to the injury in question; and the textbooks that he has in his
.own library on the subject in question. If he has mentioned bne
of the authorities on whom you rely, you are free to read from
such textbooks and ask him if he agrees or disagrees with the
statement you read.
If the defendant doctor has not mentioned the particular
textbooks upon which you relied, you may ask him if the medical
profession, as such, considers Dr. X as an authority on the par-
ticular condition you are dealing with. It is not necessary that
he, the defendant doctor, recognizes your text writer as an
authority. It is only necessary that the text writer be recognized
by the medical profession as an author.
If you fail to prove the standards of practice or causation by
your pre-trial deposition of the defendant doctor, then you should
proceed with depositions of other doctors.
As a strictly legal proposition, by the overwhelming weight
of judicial authority, a doctor must respond to a subpoena,
whether it be to appear in court, or to appear before a Notary
Public to give his deposition, and testify fully concerning all the
knowledge he may have of the particular patient involved; and
also give professional expert opinions, even though he has not
been paid or tendered an expert's fee. Furthermore, under some
decisions doctors who have never seen thL particular patient in-
volved, and even though they be specialists, must respond to a
subpoena and give their professional expert opinion concerning
any medical question asked them, and this without payment of
or promise to pay an expert fee.' 7
But I recommend to lawyers that they do not rely upon this
strictly legal obligation of the doctor. I suggest that they should
make adequate arrangements with the doctor, and that he be
paid for his time in those cases where he is not an attending
physician.
17 People v. Conte, 122 P. 450 (Calif., 1912); Dixon v. People, 48 N. E. 108
(Ill., 1897); Re Haves, 156 S. E. 791 (N. C., 1931); San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 231 P. 2d 26 (Calif., 1951); State ex rel. Berge v. Superior Court, 154
Wash. 144, 281 P. 335 (1925); 25 A. L. R. 2d 1418; 73 A. L. R. 1179; 58 Am.
Jur. 503; 13 C. J. 27.
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The purpose of taking the deposition of medical specialists
is to establish, (1) the standards of practice, both as to diagnosis
and treatment, and (2) the reasons and necessity which resulted
in the establishment of said standards of practice.
If you do have with you some of the medical books which
the witness has said are recognized as authoritative by the medi-
cal profession, you may, while examining the witness on pre-
trial deposition, ask him if he agrees with certain appropriate
statements which you read from the textbook that he has stated
is recognized by the medical profession.
It is essential that the lawyer establishes, not only the nature
and extent of his client's injury, but also the fact that the client's
condition resulted proximately from the negligence which has
been proved.
When proving by a medical witness the permanency of the
client's condition, a problem in terminology may arise. Damages
may not be awarded for such future effects based upon evidence
which is conjectural or speculative. For this reason, it is fre-
quently urged that the medical witness must testify that his
opinion as to such future effects, is based upon a "reasonable
medical certainty," or a "reasonable medical probability." There
are indeed very few medical opinions which can be predicated
upon a "reasonable medical certainty." The law only requires
that a litigant produce the best evidence available. If medical
science has not progressed to the point where a sincere, qualified
doctor can honestly express an opinion to a reasonable medical
certainty as to the future consequences of an injury,-is that any
reason why the doctor -should be prevented from stating his opin-
ion as to the "possible" consequences of the injury based upon
his learning and experience? What medical science has learned
as to "possible" consequences of similar injuries, is relevant and
material. I realize that a difference of opinion exists with refer-
ence to this question, but the Washington and California courts
support my opinion. 18
Another point to be remembered is that, in some states, an
expert medical witness, as distinguished from the treating physi-
cian, may not be permitted to relate the history given him by the
patient, if objection is made upon the ground of hearsay.
18 Dillon v. Burnett, 197 Wash. 371, 85 P. 2d 656 (1938); Nagala v. Warsing,
36 Wash. 2d 615, 219 P. 2d 603 (1950); Mellis v. Merritt, 44 Wash. 2d 181, 265
P. 2d 1058 (1954); Bauman v. San Francisco, 108 P. 2d 989 (Calif., 1940);
Cordiner v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 91 P. 436 (Calif., 1907).
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The treating physician, however, may testify as to the pa-
tient's history for the reason that it was an essential predicate to
treatment by him. If in the case of an expert who examined only
for the purpose of testifying, a lawyer is met with the objection
of hearsay, then the lawyer must of course propound a hypo-
thetical question which encompasses the client's complete medi-
cal history as testified to, as well as pertinent evidence pertaining
to the occurrence in which the trauma took place.
Another way of establishing the causal relation between the
alleged malpractice and the condition of which you complain, is
by the use of the Uniform Evidence Act, which has been adopted
by a great many of the states: "A record of an act, condition, or
event, shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the
custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and
the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular
course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa-
tion, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its
admission."
Thus, a hospital record, if it meets the requirements of the
Act, is admissible in evidence at the discretion of the court. Such
a hospital record then may be considered not only as to the
medical facts recorded therein, but also as to medical opinions
recorded there. In this way you may be able to prove the neces-
sary facts of causation. 9
These are the main points in a malpractice action. It should
be understood, of course, that other law and procedure applicable
to personal injury cases generally also apply to such actions.
19 Cantrill v. American Mail Line, 42 Wash. 2d 590, 257 P. 2d 179 (1953);
Reed v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 123 F. 2d 252 (1941); Hunter
v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F. 2d 970, 133 A. L. R. 255 (1940); Freedman v.
Mutual Insurance Co., 135 A. L. R. 1249 (Penna., 1941); Natwick v. Moyer,
163 P. 2d 936 (Ore., 1945); Weis v. Weis, 169 A. L. R. 668 (Ohio, 1947);
Gallagher v. Portland Traction, 182 P. 2d 354 (Ore., 1947); Gunter v. Clag-
gett, 151 P. 2d 271 (Calif., 1944).
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